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1 Introduction 
This paper reports a capital budgeting experiment 
that was inspired by two distinct characteristics of 
capital budgeting processes in practice. First, the 
budgeting process in firms has long been recognized 
as susceptible to informational asymmetries ex-
ploited by division managers having preferences for 
building slack into their budgets (Merchant 1985). 
This means that managers may use their informa-
tional advantage for strategic communication in a 
participative capital budgeting setting. As a result, 
budgeting processes may include hurdle rates that 
exceed a firm's cost of capital and thus may be char-
acterized by capital rationing (Poterba and Sum-
mers 1995). Second, capital budgeting practice is 
usually characterized by partial delegation: Head-
quarters neither centralize nor delegate all invest-
ment decisions, but usually delegate some decisions 
to division managers (Harris and Raviv 1996, with 
further references). Prominent criteria for delega-
tion are the size of a project or its strategic impor-
tance. 
This is the first paper to reflect both observations – 
capital rationing and partial delegation – in an ex-
perimental capital budgeting setting. The focus of 
the paper is on the interaction between the organ-
izational design of the budgeting process (centrali-
zation versus delegation) and headquarters’ ability 
to commit to a budget that rations capital (binding 
budget versus non-binding budget). In particular, 
we analyze whether the ability of headquarters to 
commit to a budgetary announcement moderates 
the effects of delegation in a capital budgeting set-
ting with asymmetric information and a division 
manager’s preference for slack. Our experiment 
provides a direct test of the effects of delegation and 
of (the loss of) commitment to budgets on the be-
havior of the involved parties and thus allows us to 
study cause-effectrelations in budgeting processes 
under controlled conditions (Sprinkle and William-
son 2007). 
Whether delegation is a useful organizational design 
alternative is a question of long-standing interest 
(see, e.g., Holmström 1984, Jensen and Meckling 
1992). When a division manager possesses decision-
relevant information, centralization will be charac-
terized by the manager’s cost report to headquarters 
and a signal-contingent decision by headquarters, 
whereas under delegation, the division manager is 
given authority to make a decision (subject to re-
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strictions set by headquarters). The central idea of 
the paper combines two arguments: first, we suggest 
that even if centralization and delegation are equiva-
lent under standard theoretical assumptions, dele-
gation might be behaviorally relevant. Second, we 
claim that the direction of the behavioral effects of 
delegation depends on headquarters’ ability to 
commit to her budget announcement. 
We distinguish between objective and subjective 
commitment. Objective commitment is generated 
by irreversible moves made by one or both players 
such as giving up options, whereas subjective com-
mitment results from motives inside a person and 
cannot be enforced exogenously. We argue that, in a 
situation where headquarters cannot objectively 
commit to a specific (centralized or decentralized) 
mechanism, delegation can serve as a substitute for 
commitment. As Holmström (1984: 32) stated: “It 
appears that delegating authority to an agent, as 
opposed to asking the agent for information and 
promising to act on the information in a particular 
way, is a more convincing form of precommitment 
(though they are formally equivalent).” In particu-
lar, under centralization, a budget announcement 
by headquarters establishes subjective commitment, 
whereas a budget under delegation establishes both 
objective and subjective commitment. We argue that 
this difference results in headquarters being more 
strongly committed to a budget under delegation. 
In contrast, in a setting where headquarters is 
committed to a binding budget, the design choice 
between centralization and delegation might be 
behaviorally relevant due to the manager’s prefer-
ences for honesty. In particular, budgets may con-
tain less slack under centralization than under dele-
gation as the manager’s cost reports to headquarters 
in the former setting make honesty preferences 
more relevant than in the latter case in which there 
is no report from the division manager to headquar-
ters at all. 
Our paper is related to two streams of research. The 
first stream builds upon the seminal papers by Har-
ris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) and Antle and Eppen 
(1985) and analyzes capital budgeting processes 
with privately held information by managers in 
order to “reconcile investment theory with actual 
practice” (Harris and Raviv 1996: 1159). Analytical 
papers in this stream (see Antle and Fellingham 
1997, Covaleski, Evans, Luft, and Shields 2003, and 
Rajan and Reichelstein 2004 for surveys) do not 
address centralization-versus-delegation issues, as 
the Revelation Principle implies that centralization 
weakly dominates delegation (Melumad and Rei-
chelstein 1987). Exceptions are studies that recon-
struct a revelation game by setting up a budgeting 
process in which decision-making authority is dele-
gated to the division manager (e.g., Harris and 
Raviv 1998, Baldenius 2003, Mookherjee 2006). 
Our experiment is based upon these studies in that 
delegation is equivalent to centralization under 
standard assumptions (full rationality and individ-
ual self-interest). Based upon the standard theoreti-
cal equivalence result, our paper is the first to ana-
lyze the behavioral relevance of delegation. To the 
best of our knowledge, the only paper that incorpo-
rates behavioral aspects of decision making (hon-
esty preferences) in an analytical capital budgeting 
model is Mittendorf (2006). 
The second stream of research comprises prior ex-
perimental studies of headquarters’ and division 
managers’ behavior in an Antle and Eppen frame-
work or a related setting. This literature is relevant 
for our study as it analyzes behavioral aspects of 
capital budgeting processes. It departs from Evans, 
Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser (2001) who focused 
on the manager's trade-off between being honest 
and maximizing income. In a setting in which head-
quarters has no possibility to control the manager’s 
cost report, they provided evidence that managers’ 
reports are affected by their preference for honesty. 
However, the experimental design makes it difficult 
to clearly distinguish between honesty preferences 
and preferences for income distributions. Rankin, 
Schwartz, and Young (2008) refined the test for 
honesty preferences in settings with and without 
superior decision authority. We will discuss their 
results in section 2.3. Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 
(2006) demonstrated that division managers are 
not only concerned with being honest but also with 
appearing honest. 
Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2003) analyzed 
binding and non-binding budget announcements 
and provided evidence that commitment is valuable 
but that non-binding announcements also have 
economic value to headquarters relative to a setting 
without announcements. While Rankin, Schwartz, 
and Young (2003) focused on budget announce-
ments as cheap talk, they did not consider organiza-
tional issues of the budgeting process and did not 
analyze whether and how the degree of commitment 
interacts with the organizational design. 
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Our principal findings are: There is overall evidence 
for our conjecture that commitment moderates the 
effects of delegation in capital budgeting as there is 
an interaction effect of delegation and (the loss of) 
commitment to budgets. That means, delegation 
indeed possesses behavioral relevance in the setting 
we study. The effects of delegation are particularly 
strong when headquarters cannot commit to the 
budget. Here, slack and the subordinate payoff are 
lower and headquarters’ payoff (the net return to 
the firm) is higher under delegation than under 
centralization. These effects are both economically 
and statistically significant. Our results support the 
view that delegation represents an (incomplete) 
substitute for commitment in a situation where 
contractual or reputational commitment is not pos-
sible, and that this commitment is anticipated by 
managers. When headquarters can commit to the 
budget, the descriptive data are consistent with the 
conjecture that honesty preferences negatively affect 
capital budgeting under delegation but the effects 
are not significant. Thus, our results give only lim-
ited support for honesty preferences to have a major 
influence on the outcomes of the budgeting process. 
We conclude that centralization versus delegation is 
a relevant organizational design issue as it affects 
capital budgeting processes in different ways con-
tingent on the degree of budgetary commitment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
In section 2, we develop our hypotheses. Section 3 
explains the experimental method. Section 4 con-
tains our results, and section 5 concludes. 
2 Hypothesis development 
2.1 Setting 
The experimental design builds upon the setting of 
Antle and Eppen (1985). It models a single-period 
bilateral relationship between headquarters (HQ) 
and a division manager (the DM). All treatments 
have a common structure: HQ delegates the realiza-
tion of an investment project to the DM. The reve-
nue of the project is certain, whereas the project 
costs are uncertain. For simplicity, the maximum 
cost does not exceed the revenue. The distribution 
of costs is common knowledge but only the subor-
dinate learns the actual costs at the beginning of a 
given round. HQ only has the possibility to acquire a 
costly imperfect signal about the actual costs after 
having received the cost report from the DM. If the 
project is realized, the DM’s payoff is equal to slack, 
which is the difference between the budget allocated 
to him and the project cost, and HQ receives the 
residual, which is the revenue less the allocated 
budget. If, in contrast, the project is not realized, the 
DM and HQ both receive a payoff of zero. 
Under centralization, at the beginning of the budg-
eting process, HQ makes a budgetary announce-
ment specifying the spending limit for the DM, i.e., 
the maximum costs that will be funded. The an-
nouncement may be binding or non-binding. Then 
the DM learns the actual cost and makes a cost re-
port to HQ. Under a binding budget, HQ is commit-
ted to denying funding whenever the cost report 
exceeds the limit. If the cost report does not exceed 
the limit, the project is realized and the DM receives 
a budget equal to his cost report. Under a non-
binding budget, HQ receives the cost report and 
subsequently decides about project realization with-
out being committed to her announcement. Again, if 
the project is realized, the DM receives a budget 
equal to his cost report.  
Under delegation, HQ first allocates a budget to the 
DM. The corresponding transfer of decision-making 
authority is conditional upon whether the actual 
costs exceed the budget or not: When actual costs 
are below the budget, the DM can decide whether to 
accept or reject project realization. If he realizes the 
project, he also decides about his expenditure. In 
contrast, when the actual costs exceed the budget, 
funding is automatically denied under a binding 
budget but if the budget is non-binding, the DM can 
either reject the project or request a budget increase. 
Requesting a budget increase returns decision au-
thority to HQ. If HQ accepts the request, the re-
quested budget is allocated to the DM. 
2.2 Equivalence Hypotheses 
We first develop hypotheses from the standard as-
sumptions of full rationality and pure financial self-
interest. Under these assumptions, centralization 
and delegation are equivalent. With binding budg-
ets, the DM always reports costs equal to the budg-
etary announcement under centralization, whereas, 
under delegation, the DM expends the full budget 
allocated to him and never returns resources to HQ. 
With non-binding budgets, the DM's optimal strat-
egy under centralization is to report costs equal to 
the revenue minus epsilon, and HQ will always ac-
cept. The solution is replicated under delegation: 
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Although HQ delegates decision-making authority 
to the DM by allocating a budget to him, the DM will 
always return the decision to HQ and request a 
budget increase up to the revenue minus epsilon, 
and HQ will accept. 
The equivalence of centralization and delegation 
carries over to general assumptions about financial 
preferences incorporating altruism, inequity aver-
sion or distributional fairness (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt 2006). The reason is that the treatment 
variable has no direct effect on monetary outcomes. 
We state the equivalence of centralization and dele-
gation under non-binding and binding budgets 
separately, as we will formulate an alternative hy-
pothesis for each in the following section. 
H1a: For non-binding budgets, centralization and 
delegation are equivalent with respect to cost re-
ports, expenditures or budget requests, respectively, 
and with respect to HQ’s and the DM’s payoffs. 
H2a: For binding budgets, centralization and dele-
gation are equivalent with respect to cost reports, 
expenditures or budget requests, respectively, and 
with respect to HQ’s and the DM’s payoffs. 
2.3 Behavioral Hypotheses 
Our study focuses on two motives outside the scope 
of financial preferences: honesty preferences and 
subjective commitment. We will explain their influ-
ence in the following, starting with subjective com-
mitment by discussing the role of delegation for the 
non-binding budgets case. 
Non-binding budgets and subjective commitment 
In contrast to the standard theoretical predictions, 
prior experimental evidence (e.g., Croson, Boles, 
and Murnighan 2003, Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 
2003) suggests that non-binding announcements 
may be useful for HQ. By making a budgetary an-
nouncement in the centralization setting, HQ may 
signal either the maximum cost she is willing to 
fund or the range of cost reports she is determined 
to verify by buying information. Signaling presup-
poses commitment by HQ to her announcement. 
We distinguish objective and subjective commit-
ment (which is equivalent to Hirshleifer’s distinc-
tion between pre-emptive and reactive commit-
ment, see Hirshleifer 2001: 79-80). If it arises from 
irreversible moves by one or both players, commit-
ment is objective, which makes commitment exoge-
nous to the subsequent relationship between the 
players. Examples are writing binding contracts or 
giving up options (by other means than a contract). 
In contrast, commitment is subjective if it can be 
neither enforced nor established by reputational 
effects (Frank 2001). Subjective commitment re-
sults from motives within a person (Nesse 2000, 
Hirshleifer 2001, Frank 2001). Two main reasons 
for HQ’s subjective commitment evolving in our 
setting are reciprocity and its sources (e.g., Elster 
1998, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Thaler 2000), and 
the desire to behave consistently, i.e., to “keep the 
promise” made by the budget announcement 
(Cialdini 1993, ch. 3). We interpret subjective com-
mitment to be gradual and not dichotomous, i.e., 
only present or absent. 
In our setting, under centralization, HQ’s commit-
ment is purely subjective: HQ announces a budget, 
but always makes the last move in deciding about 
project realization. In contrast, under delegation, 
HQ’s commitment is both objective and subjective: 
It is objective because the budget allocation to DM is 
irrevocable and thus the DM has the option to de-
cide about project realization whenever the true cost 
does not exceed the budget. It is subjective because 
the DM also has the option to request a budget in-
crease, and the initial budget allocation entails the 
threat to reject the request. 
There is prior evidence supporting the view that 
subjective commitment has an effect on HQ’s be-
havior in a budget setting like ours. Rankin, 
Schwartz, and Young (2003) considered three treat-
ments. One of them, the non-binding announce-
ment (NBA) treatment, is equivalent to our centrali-
zation treatment; another is a no announcement 
(NA) treatment without any opportunity for HQ to 
build up subjective commitment. Rankin, Schwartz, 
and Young (2003) found that HQ-players (DM-
players) received higher (lower) payoffs in the NBA 
treatment, but that this was not accompanied by 
lower rejection rates in the NBA treatment. This 
means that, on average, HQ-players rejected lower 
budget-breaking cost reports from DM-players in 
the NBA treatment than in the NA treatment, which 
is exactly what subjective commitment would imply. 
Given that a non-binding announcement provides 
some subjective commitment under centralization, 
we conjecture that, under delegation, the budget 
allocation provides a stronger form of subjective 
commitment. In this sense, we speak of delegation 
as a substitute for commitment, and that we inter-
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pret Holmström’s idea we cited in the introduction. 
We have two reasons for our conjecture which are 
related to the sources of subjective commitment. 
First, the initial budget allocation to the DM repre-
sents a transfer of the decision right to the DM 
whenever the actual costs are below the budget. In 
these cases the DM has a riskless alternative: Real-
ize the project and decide about an expenditure that 
does not exceed the budget. If, in contrast, the DM 
requests a budget increase, he returns the decision 
right to HQ and foregoes the riskless alternative. 
Thus, a budget-breaking request by the DM is likely 
to be perceived as a more “unkind” act than a budg-
et-breaking cost report under centralization, which 
is likely to reinforce reciprocity as a source of sub-
jective commitment. Second, objective commitment 
is likely to have a direct, reinforcing effect on subjec-
tive commitment: As HQ transfers capital and a 
conditional decision right to the DM, the budget 
provides stronger subjective commitment to “keep 
the promise” than a mere announcement of a budg-
et limit under centralization.  
We expect two consequences from these different 
impacts of the institutional settings on subjective 
commitment: First, we expect increased subjective 
commitment to raise, ceteris paribus, HQ’s willing-
ness to reject budget requests under delegation. 
Second, we expect the DM-players to anticipate the 
first effect, and thus, we expect delegation to induce 
smaller expenditures or budget requests. Accord-
ingly, we expect the DM’s payoff to be smaller and 
the level of successful budget requests to be lower 
under delegation than under centralization. These 
are two countervailing effects on HQ’s payoff, and 
consequently, the theoretical prediction is not un-
ambiguous. However, prior experimental evidence 
in the same framework has shown that the DM’s 
anticipation of non-monetary preferences can be 
strong enough to be beneficial to HQ (Hannan, 
Rankin, and Towry 2006, Arnold and Schreiber 
2009). Thus we state: 
H1b: When budgets are non-binding, expenditures 
or budget requests under delegation are smaller 
than cost reports under centralization, and delega-
tion yields a smaller payoff to the DM and a larger 
payoff to HQ than centralization. 
Binding budgets and honesty preferences 
Next, we discuss the role of honesty preferences. In 
our experimental setting, when budgeting is central-
ized, the DM reports costs to HQ, and in order to 
create slack the DM has to lie and overstate the 
actual costs in the cost report. In contrast, in the 
delegation setting, the DM expends resources, 
which has no relation to lying or truth telling. As a 
consequence, we are able to analyze the role of pref-
erences for honesty by comparing centralization and 
delegation. If present and sufficiently strong, such 
honesty preferences will reduce the cost report un-
der centralization, whereas they will not affect the 
expenditure under delegation.  
Our discussion of the effects of honesty preferences 
under centralization follows Luft (1997) and the 
recent literature on honesty preferences in budget-
ing contexts (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 
2001, Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 2006, Mitten-
dorf 2006, Salterio and Webb 2006, Rankin, 
Schwartz, and Young 2008). It applies to a large 
variety of models of honesty preferences. Suppose 
that the DM has a preference for own income, a 
preference for income distributions, and a prefer-
ence for honesty. Further suppose that the prefer-
ence for honesty is not dichotomous (i.e., for the 
DM there exist “big lies” and “small lies”, not just 
lies), and that the DM’s utility is a smooth function 
of the size of the lie. Then, he will trade off his finan-
cial preferences against his preferences for honesty. 
However, this trade-off will not be unaffected by 
strategic considerations, as these considerations 
might crowd out intrinsic motives such as honesty 
preferences (Buller and Burgoon 1996, Gneezy 
2005, Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 2008).  
In order to categorize the complexity of strategic 
considerations in our budgeting setting, we identify 
three factors: The first is the frequency and form of 
interaction. The second is authority: Interaction 
may have no strategic dimension if one of the inter-
acting parties has no authority about the budget. 
The third is the sequence of actions. Of course, HQ’s 
authority is what primarily counts when we study 
DM’s honesty preferences. Thus, we expect interac-
tion to be “more strategic” if HQ moves after DM 
and “less strategic” if DM moves after HQ. Using 
these three factors, we can rank different budgeting 
settings as follows: (1) HQ is passive and accepts any 
cost report by the DM. This setting was studied by 
Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 2001, by 
Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 2006 and by Rankin, 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 
Volume 4 | Issue 1 | March 2011 | - 
1 
Schwartz, and Young 2008. (2) HQ objectively 
commits to a budget by making a binding an-
nouncement. This is our centralization setting with 
a binding budget, where HQ has authority, but the 
DM’s cost report is the last move. (3) HQ makes the 
investment decision after the DM’s cost report, i.e., 
there is no announcement and HQ moves last. This 
setting was studied in Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 
2008. (4) Setting (3) plus a non-binding an-
nouncement by HQ. This corresponds to our cen-
tralization setting with a non-binding budget.  
In comparing settings (1) and (3), Rankin, Schwartz, 
and Young 2008 found a reduction in slack of about 
25% due to honesty preferences in setting (1), but 
virtually no effect of honesty preferences on the 
DM’s cost reports in setting (3). The authors con-
cluded that strategic interaction between HQ and 
the DM crowds out the effect of honesty preferences 
on cost reports. As our centralization setting with a 
non-binding budget announcement ranks top with 
respect to the complexity of strategic interaction, we 
do not expect any incremental effects of honesty in 
the non-binding treatments. In contrast, our cen-
tralization setting with a binding budget ranks in-
termediate between (1) and (3), and we thus expect 
honesty preferences to be relevant in this setting, 
but not in the comparable delegation setting where 
the DM makes no report. The corresponding hy-
pothesis is H2b. 
H2b: When budgets are binding, cost reports under 
centralization will be lower than budget expendi-
tures under delegation, the DM’s payoff will be low-
er under centralization and HQ’s payoff will be 
higher. 
H1b and H2b together establish the research ques-
tion of the experiment with respect to the moderat-
ing effect of commitment on the effects of delega-
tion. When budgets are binding, delegation will lead 
to higher budget expenditures relative to cost re-
ports under centralization, a higher payoff for the 
DM and a lower payoff for HQ. When budgets are 
non-binding, the inverse relationships hold. We 
now state this interaction effect that follows from 
H1b and H2b as a hypothesis: 
H3: Commitment moderates the effects of delega-
tion, i.e., the effects of delegation on cost reports, 
expenditures or budget requests and on HQ’s and 
the DM’s payoffs depend on the binding or non-
binding character of budgetary announcements. 
3 Experimental Method 
3.1 Experimental design and participants 
We used a (2x2) factorial design (commitment 
yes/no  centralization/delegation) to test our hy-
potheses. Both factors were manipulated between 
subjects. The four resulting treatments are: centrali-
zation and binding budgets (CB), delegation and 
binding budgets (DB), centralization and non-
binding budgets (CNB), and delegation and non-
binding budgets (DNB). 160 students from the Uni-
versity of Göttingen participated in the experiment, 
40 for every treatment. Two sessions were con-
ducted for every treatment, and no subject partici-
pated in more than one session. Participants inter-
acted through a computer network with full ano-
nymity. Interaction was one-shot. 10 rounds were 
played. Each subject was assigned to one of two 
roles: A-players acted as headquarters; B-players 
acted as division managers. The representative roles 
in the budgeting game were used only once in the 
instructions (see Appendix). HQ and the DM were 
randomly re-matched after each round such that the 
DM never reported to the same HQ more than once, 
and this was common knowledge.  
Participants received a show-up fee of 5 EUR and 
collected points during the experiment. Each par-
ticipant received an account with an initial balance 
of 100 points. The initial balance served as a mini-
mum wage for the DM and guaranteed HQ not to 
have a negative income, even if she bought costly 
information (see below) and received a zero payoff 
from the project. At the end of the experiment, 
points were converted into EUR, where 50 points 
corresponded to 1 EUR. Participants earned be-
tween 7.00 and 22.86 EUR in sessions of 60 to 75 
minutes. Compensations were paid out directly after 
the end of the sessions. Participants were recruited 
on campus, mostly in lectures with large audiences. 
The experiment was computerized and imple-
mented with the software SOPHIE (Hendriks 2010). 
When subjects arrived at the laboratory, they were 
randomly assigned to computer terminals and were 
separated by blinders to ensure anonymity. 
Before the experiment began, instructions (see Ap-
pendix) were displayed on the computer screens 
and were simultaneously read aloud to the partici-
pants. We included a set of control questions in the 
instructions in order to ensure that all participants 
understood the experimental procedures and the 
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payoff functions. Correct answers to control ques-
tions were followed by positive feedback; wrong 
answers were followed by feedback repeating the 
relevant information given in the instructions. 
We chose an experimental approach to analyze our 
research questions as experiments allow disentan-
gling the effects of different variables that are con-
founded in studies that are based on field data. In 
particular, as it is almost impossible to observe the 
degree of commitment inherent to capital budgeting 
rules and processes in firms we chose to manipulate 
this variable instead of trying to observe it. That 
way, by controlling all other potential variables, our 
experimental approach allows us to draw inferences 
with respect to the effects of delegation as an organ-
izational design variable, the degree of commitment 
and their interaction on behavior in budgeting proc-
esses. 
As we explained above, we chose a one-shot or 
“strangers” design for our experiment. This means 
that we used a rotation matching scheme (Kamecke 
1997) for participants that ensured that a rational 
participant acted as if he played a separate game in 
each round of the experiment. We chose the one-
shot setting mainly for two reasons: First, our hy-
potheses are based on the argument that delegation 
increases commitment to the budget. A one-shot 
design allows us to analyze this question by simul-
taneously holding constant all other sources of in-
creased commitment. An alternative means in real-
ity to increase commitment is reputation. Conse-
quently, a repeated interaction design or “partners” 
treatment would make it more difficult to attribute 
the observed effects to its causes. Moreover, it is 
unclear why a repeated interaction per se should 
eliminate the effects of delegation on commitment. 
Second, a one-shot design is necessary if we want to 
compare our results to the results in Rankin 
Schwartz, and Young (2003 and 2008), as these 
studies also analyzed a strangers design. 
3.2 The Budgeting Process 
The revenue of the project was 200 points; the ac-
tual costs were drawn from a uniform distribution 
with support [0, 1, 2, ..., 199, 200]. The first-best 
solution implies that the project is realized with 
certainty. The ex-ante expected payoff to HQ would 
then be 100. Standard analysis leads to an optimal 
binding budgetary announcement (for both cen-
tralization and delegation) of 100, such that the 
project will be realized with 50% probability. The 
expected payoffs for this solution would be 50 for 
HQ and 25 for the DM. Standard analysis implies 
irrelevance of the non-binding budget, and the DM 
would report costs or request a budget, respectively, 
of 199 (as long as actual costs are below this value) 
such that HQ loses almost the whole expected pro-
ject value to the DM. 
At the beginning of each round, the DM learned the 
actual cost. For all 10 rounds, 10 different values 
were randomly chosen as actual costs. The different 
values were assigned to player pairs such that actual 
costs were identical for all players. Then, HQ and 
the DM interacted. In the centralization treatments 
CB and CNB, HQ sent an announcement to the DM 
with respect to the maximum cost that she would 
accept and fund. Then, the DM made a cost report. 
The DM could not understate the actual cost, but he 
could overstate the cost up to the revenue. In case of 
a project approval, the DM received a budget equal 
to his cost report, and HQ's payoff equaled the reve-
nue less the budget. When the budgetary an-
nouncement was binding, the project decision au-
tomatically followed from comparing the cost report 
to the announcement. In the delegation treatments 
DB and DNB, instead of announcing a budget limit, 
HQ allocated a budget to the DM such that the DM 
was given the right to decide about project realiza-
tion as long as the actual cost did not exceed the 
allocated budget. If the budget covered the actual 
cost, the DM had to decide about the expenditure, 
which was reported to HQ. That is, the DM could 
return money to HQ. When the budget was non-
binding, the DM could also request a budget in-
crease, which transferred the decision back to HQ. 
HQ could either approve the request and allocate 
the requested budget to the DM or deny funding. 
Under delegation and for both binding and non-
binding budgets, the DM always had the opportu-
nity to reject project realization. At the end of the 
rounds, payoffs were realized and the round ended. 
In all treatments, HQ was given the chance to ac-
quire information about the actual cost after the DM 
made his cost report (centralization) or decided 
about the expenditure or his budget request (delega-
tion). The design of the information technology is 
similar to the design in Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 
(2006). HQ could spend 10 points to buy a signal 
which reported a range for the actual cost. The sup-
port [0, 200] was divided into eight ranges [0..25], 
..., [176..200]. The signal was correct with 70% 
probability, but with 30% probability it randomly 
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reported a wrong range. The monitoring technology 
was common knowledge, and the DM was informed 
about HQ’s decision to buy the signal at the end of 
each round. 
Our setting has the structure of ultimatum bargain-
ing under imperfect information with binding or 
non-binding announcements of the responder about 
rejection levels. To the best of our knowledge, the 
only study of ultimatum bargaining with imperfect 
information and non-binding announcements is 
Croson, Boles, and Murnighan (2003). In particu-
lar, their result that announcements by responders 
in the ultimatum game affect the proposers’ behav-
iors is closely related to the results in Rankin, 
Schwartz, and Young (2003) and to our results. 
3.3 Measures 
In the following we will denote the project’s actual 
costs by ACTUALCOST, which was balanced be-
tween treatments and subjects. In all treatments, 
HQ’s budgetary announcement will be denoted by 
BUDGET, and we will use REPEXP to denote both 
the cost report HQ receives under centralization and 
the expenditure or budget request under delegation, 
respectively. If the project is realized, the DM’s pay-
off equals DM = REPEXP  ACTUALCOST, whereas 
HQ’s payoff is HQ = 200  REPEXP. Thus, if the 
project is realized DM corresponds to the slack. If 
the project is not realized, both payoffs are zero. 
HQ’s payoff is further reduced by 10 if she acquires 
information. In the binding treatments, the DM’s 
choice of REPEXP was arbitrary for all cases in 
which the project was not realized (particularly for 
all cases where the actual costs exceeded the binding 
budget). Thus, we exclude these observations from 
our analysis when comparing the CB and DB treat-
ments with respect to REPEXP.  
To represent HQ’s beliefs at the moment she makes 
her project decision, we define an additional vari-
able, ESTSLACK. To calculate ESTSLACK, we re-
construct a Bayesian estimation procedure by HQ. 
For simplicity, we first assume that, after observing 
REPEXP, HQ estimates every potential level of AC-
TUALCOST to be equally likely. Consequently, for 
uninformed decisions, ESTSLACK equals BUDG-
ET  REPEXP/2. For informed decisions, we use 
Bayes rule to calculate the posterior distribution for 
ACTUALCOST given REPEXP and the signal re-
ceived and, for an informed decision, ESTSLACK 
equals the difference between this posterior belief 
for ACTUALCOST and BUDGET. Thus, ESTSLACK 
represents HQ’s estimation of the maximum slack 
the DM could have created by not breaking the 
budget, i.e., by making a report or an expenditure 
REPEXP = BUDGET. 
4 Results 
4.1 Tests of hypotheses 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the meas-
ures used in the analysis.1 For the CB and the DB 
treatment, the means of HQ and DM refer to all ten 
rounds, whereas the means of REPEXP refer only to 
the rounds in which the project was realized. Table 1 
further presents the corresponding T-tests (we can-
not reject the respective measures to be normally 
distributed; all p-values  0.24). For each test, the 
unit of observation is the mean value per participant 
over all rounds (e.g., Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 
2003 and 2008). All T-tests are one-sided. 
Table 1 shows that HQ-players set binding budgets 
well above 100 (121.14 for CB, 123.54 for DB), so 
that the project is realized in more than 50% of the 
cases, with 100 and 50% being the standard-
theoretical predictions for BUDGET and the realiza-
tion frequency, respectively. In the case of non-
binding budgets, budget announcements under 
centralization are somewhat higher than budget 
allocations under delegation. However, both in the 
binding and the non-binding case, the differences in 
BUDGET between centralization and delegation are 
statistically not significant. 
H1a and H1b refer to potential differences in 
REPEXP, DM and HQ in the non-binding case. In 
fact, while H1a predicts the equivalence of centrali-
zation and delegation, H1b states that delegation 
implies lower levels of REPEXP and DM and a 
higher level of HQ than centralization. Figure 1a 
displays the development of the mean REPEXP (left 
y-axis) and of HQ (right y-axis) over time in the 
non-binding case. As can be seen, REPEXP is con-
sistently lower and HQ is consistently higher under 
delegation. 
The figure does not reveal any significant time or 
end-game effect. This evidence is consistent with 
H1b. The data and T-tests included in Table 1 fur-
ther confirm this hypothesis: HQ-players receive 
                                                             
1 The raw data and the full instructions in German can be downloaded 
from www.business-research.org. 
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lower budget requests under delegation than budget 
reports under centralization (REPEXP, 156.21 vs. 
161.49, p = 0.0036). This translates into a signifi-
cantly lower payoff for the DM-players under dele-
gation (DM, 45.70 vs. 52.81, p = 0.0150) and a sig-
nificantly higher payoff for HQ (HQ, 37.12 vs. 
32.80, p = 0.0653). Thus, our results reject H1a and 
are consistent with H1b. DM-players seem to antici-
pate a higher subjective commitment of the HQ-
players to the allocated budget in the delegation 
case, and this turns out to be overall financially ben-
eficial for HQ. In the supplementary analysis, we 
will provide further evidence with respect to the 
question of whether this was indeed the case. 
H2a and H2b refer to the case of binding budgets. 
Again, H2a states the equivalence of centralization 
and delegation whereas H2b states that honesty 
preferences will induce lower REPEXP and DM and 
higher HQ under centralization than under delega-
tion. Figure 1b reveals that although REPEXP tends 
to be lower and HQ tends to be higher under cen-
tralization, the differences are not as unambiguous 
as in the non-binding case. Again, the figure does 
not indicate any end-game effect. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Panel 1) and T-tests (Panel 2) 
 
 Panel 1: Descriptive Statistics CB DB CNB DNB 
Cases 200 200 200 200 
project realized (cases) 115 113 157 152 
         DNB only: decisions made by the DM (of these: project realizations) 24 (21) 
information acquired (cases) 29 18 35 37 
 BUDGET                                                                    mean 121.14 123.54 100.50 91.04 
standard deviation 14.51 15.73 35.47 17.84 
 REPEXP                                                                    mean 124.47 128.83 161.49 156.21 
standard deviation 17.20 15.38 5.66 5.85 
 |HQ                                                                              mean 41.98 39.31 32.80 37.12 
standard deviation 8.76 8.62 9.65 7.98 
 |DM                                                                             mean 34.05 36.22 52.81 45.70 
standard deviation 11.78 8.27 10.95 8.92 
 
 Panel 2: T-tests CB vs. DB CNB vs. DNB CB vs. CNB DB vs. DNB 
 BUDGET                                     t    -0.5015 1.0655 2.4091 6.1120 
(p-value) (0.3095) (0.1467) (0.0105**) (0.0000***) 
 REPEXP                                     t    -0.9282 -5.2210 
(p-value) (0.1795) 
n.a. 
(0.0000***) 
n.a. 
 |HQ                                              t    0.9715 -1.5450 3.1519 0.8339 
(p-value) (0.1687) (0.0653*) (0.0016***) (0.2048) 
 |DM                                              t    -0.6725 2.2516 -5.2167 -3.4859 
(p-value) (0.2625) (0.0150**) (0.0016***) (0.0006***) 
This table displays means and standard deviations for all measures in all treatments (Panel 1), and T-tests (Panel 2). The treatments 
are centralization and binding budgets (CB), delegation and binding budgets (DB), centralization and non-binding budgets (CNB), 
and delegation and non-binding budgets (DNB).  
All T-tests are one-sided. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
For all variables, we used individual averages across rounds as the unit of observation. Thus, the number of observations used for 
every T-test is 20 for every treatment, one per participant. 
T-tests with respect to REPEXP for binding versus non-binding budgets are not available, as the DM’s choice of REPEXP was arbi-
trary for all cases ACTUALCOST  BUDGET in the binding treatments. 
Variable definitions: 
BUDGET = headquarters’ announced budget limit (CB, CNB) or allocated budget (DB, DNB); 
REPEXP = division manager’s cost report (CB, CNB), expenditure or budget request (DB, DNB); 
HQ = headquarters’ payoff = project revenue (200) – cost report/budget expenditure if the project is realized and 0 else; 
DM = division manager’s payoff = cost report/budget expenditure – actual costs if the project is realized and 0 else. 
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Figure 1a:  Non-binding budgets  Development of the DM-players’ mean cost reports  
(CNB), expenditures or budget requests (DNB) over time (REPEXP, left y-axis), and of  
the HQ-players’ mean payoffs (HQ, right y-axis). 
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Figure 1b:  Binding budgets  Development of the DM-players’ mean cost reports (CB),  
expenditures or budget requests (DB) over time (REPEXP, left y-axis), and of the HQ-
players’ mean payoffs (HQ, right y-axis). 
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As Table 1 shows, for binding budgets, mean REP-
EXP is larger (128.83 vs. 124.47), mean DM is larger 
(36.22 vs. 34.05), and mean HQ is smaller (39.31 vs. 
41.98) for delegation than for centralization. These 
descriptive data are in line with the prediction of 
H2b. However, these differences are small in magni-
tude, and none of them are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. We thus cannot reject H2a and 
find no support for H2b. With respect to the role of 
honesty preferences, we conclude that even a weak 
form of strategic interaction, i.e., HQ’s binding an-
nouncement, seems to be sufficient to crowd out 
honesty preferences of the DM. Thus, in addition to 
Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008), our results 
show that it is not necessary that HQ makes the 
final move in the “budget game” for honesty prefer-
ences to be crowded out by strategic considerations. 
Hypothesis H3 states that the effects of delegation 
on REPEXP, DM and HQ depend on the binding or 
non-binding nature of budgets as commitment 
serves as a moderator with respect to the effects of 
delegation. Although H2b could not be supported, 
the descriptive data in this case as well as 
the results of the T-tests on H1a and H1b are consis-
tent with this hypothesis. Table 2 additionally pre-
sents the results of a direct test of H3 by analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) for the three measures. In the 
ANOVA, we do not control for ACTUALCOSTS as 
these are balanced between treatments and partici-
pants. In each of the three panels, the table displays 
the main effects of the treatment variables, here 
labeled as “nonbind” (nonbind = 0 denotes binding 
budgets) and “delegate” (delegate = 0 denotes cen-
tralization), and the interaction effect. H3 implies 
that we should not observe a main effect for delega-
tion in the ANOVA, but an interaction effect be-
tween “delegate” and “nonbind”. 
The ANOVA results are consistent with the predic-
tion: The main effect of delegation on REPEXP, HQ 
and DM is not statistically significant, but we ob-
serve a statistically significant interaction effect in 
all three cases which supports the view of commit-
ment as a moderating variable for the effects of 
delegation. Moreover, for all three measures, Table 
2 shows a significant main effect of commitment 
which implies that commitment is still valuable for 
HQ. Fig. 2 illustrates the interaction effect for HQ. 
Table 2:   ANOVA results for REPEXP, HQ and DM. 
 
Panel 1: REPEXP Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic p-value        
nonbind 23078.48 1 23078.48 152.00 0.0000 *** 
delegate 1.20 1 1.20 0.01 0.9294        
nonbind  delegate 511.51 1 511.51 3.37 0.0703 *     
Residual  11538.88 76 151.83   
 
Panel 2: HQ Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic p-value        
nonbind 646.95 1 646.95 8.41 0.0049 *** 
delegate 13.70 1 13.70 0.18 0.6743        
nonbind  delegate 244.65 1 244.65 3.18 0.0786 *     
Residual  5848.09 76 76.95   
 
Panel 3: DM Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic p-value        
nonbind 3988.90 1 3988.90 39.23 0.0000 *** 
delegate 122.27 1 122.27 1.20 0.2763         
nonbind  delegate 430.13 1 430.13 4.23 0.0431 **    
Residual  7727.65 76 101.68   
 
This table reports between-subjects effects of ANOVAs for cost reports/budget expenditures (REPEXP), headquarters’ 
payoff (HQ) and the division managers’ payoff (DM). The factors are non-binding budgets (nonbind: 1/0) and dele-
gation (delegate: 1/0).  
We use all four treatments in the ANOVAs. The average values per subject are used as dependent variables. Every 
ANOVA includes 4 (treatments) · 20 (headquarters or division managers) = 80 observations. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
Variable definitions: 
REPEXP = division manager’s cost report (CB, CNB), expenditure or budget request (DB, DNB); 
HQ = headquarters’ payoff = project revenue (200) – cost report/budget expenditure if the project is realized and 0 
else; 
DM = division manager’s payoff = cost report/budget expenditure – actual costs if the project is realized and 0 else. 
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Figure 2:  Illustration of the ANOVA results  
for HQ: Main and interaction effects of a 
loss of commitment to budgets (“nonbind”) 
and of delegation. 
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4.2 Supplementary analysis 
The results reported in the preceding section sup-
port the notion of delegation as a commitment de-
vice for HQ under non-binding conditions. The 
results rely on tests of the main measures REPEXP 
and the payoffs. In the following, we provide sup-
plementary evidence with respect to the subjective 
commitment of HQ-players. Therefore, we analyze 
HQ-players’ decisions to realize projects and to 
acquire information. In particular, we address three 
questions: (i) Did HQ-players reject more and lower 
budget requests under delegation than budget-
breaking cost reports under centralization? (ii) 
Which factors influenced HQ-players’ project deci-
sions? (iii) Which factors influenced HQ-players’ 
decisions to acquire information? 
(i) We find that HQ-players’ project acceptance 
rates for cases in which the DM-players broke the 
budget (REPEXP > BUDGET) are similar for both 
centralization (136 out of 157 cases, 86.6%) and 
delegation (131 out of 152, 86.1%). This means that 
HQ-players did not reject budget requests under 
delegation more frequently than budget-breaking 
cost reports under centralization. However, the 
mean levels of REPEXP in these cases differ: Under 
centralization, the mean cost report that was ac-
cepted by HQ is 155.99 whereas, under delegation, 
the mean budget request that was accepted is 
148.72. This difference is highly statistically signifi-
cant (T-test, one-sided, p = 0.006). Thus, under 
delegation, the budget request an HQ-player was 
willing to fund is significantly lower than under 
centralization. This implies that HQ-players indeed 
were more strongly committed to the budget they 
allocated to the DM-players at the beginning of the 
round, and this effect was anticipated by the DM-
players. 
(ii) In order to further explore the determinants of 
HQ-players’ project decisions, we conducted regres-
sion analyses. We used LOGIT regressions with 
individual fixed effects and standard errors clus-
tered at HQ level in order to account for multiple 
observations within subjects.  
Panel 1 of Table 3 presents the results of the LOGIT 
regressions for the CNB and DNB treatments ex-
plaining the probability of project acceptance by 
HQ-players. In these regressions, we use REPEXP, 
PAYHISTHQ and ESTSLACK as explanatory vari-
ables. ESTSLACK represents HQ’s expectations 
with respect to the maximum slack the DM could 
have created without breaking the budget. The 
higher ESTSLACK, the more likely HQ will perceive 
a budget request by the DM to be an unkind act. 
Consequently, if HQ’s subjective commitment is 
higher under delegation than under centralization, 
we should observe a stronger reaction of HQ to this 
measure in the delegation setting than in the cen-
tralization setting. 
Indeed, the regressions show that in the delegation 
case, HQ’s project decision does not only depend on 
the absolute level of REPEXP, but also on EST-
SLACK. Thus, the more slack the DM could have 
realized by not breaking the budget, the less likely is 
HQ’s project acceptance under delegation. In con-
trast, under centralization, ESTSLACK has no statis-
tically significant influence, which means that HQ’s 
decision only depends on the absolute level of 
REPEXP. These results provide further supportive 
evidence with respect to the conjecture that HQ-
players exhibit higher subjective commitment to 
their budgets and that a budget-breaking behavior 
weighs more heavily in this case.  
(iii) Panel 2 of Table 3 displays the results of the 
regression analyses we conducted for the HQ-
players’ information acquisition under centraliza-
tion and delegation. As above, individual fixed ef-
fects are included in the regressions but not re-
ported in the table. As independent variables, we 
use BUDGET and the difference REPEXPBUD-
GET. Thus, the decision to acquire information is 
explained by the degree to which the DM’s report 
exceeds the budget and by the budget itself. In par-
ticular, if the relation between information acquisi-
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tion and the budget is positive, this implies that the 
higher the initial budget, the more likely is informa-
tion acquisition. This means that information acqui-
sition would depend on the initial “generosity” of 
the budget, a relation that should be particularly 
relevant for delegation. As a control variable, we use 
the payoff history, PAYHISTHQ, to account for 
round, learning, and wealth effects. For a given 
round, PAYHISTHQ equals HQ’s aggregate payoff up 
to this round.  
Table 3:  Regression analyses of headquarters’ decision to accept projects (Panel 1) and to  
acquire information (Panel 2). 
Panel 1 
Dependent variable: 
project choice by HQ 
   Centralization (CNB)       Delegation (DNB) 
Independent variables Coefficient 
robust 
st.err. z   p-value  Coefficient 
robust 
st.err. z   p-value 
Constant 21.966 7.2725 3.02 0.003 ***  23.689 4.7982 4.94 0.000 *** 
REPEXP -0.129 0.0397 -3.25 0.001 ***  -0.138 0.0288 -4.78 0.000 *** 
ESTSLACK -0.010 0.0104 -0.94 0.348        -0.023 0.0099 -2.36 0.018  **  
PAYHISTHQ -0.003 0.0034 -0.79 0.428        0.012 0.0031 4.01 0.000 *** 
N      160#           143#     
Pseudo-R2       0.506            0.498     
 
Panel 2 
Dependent variable:   
information acquisition by HQ 
    Centralization (CNB)      Delegation (DNB) 
Independent variables Coefficient 
robust 
st.err. z   p-value  Coefficient 
robust 
st.err. z   p-value 
Constant -0.546 1.2578 -0.43 0.664        -3.783 1.2251 -3.09 0.002 *** 
BUDGET -0.009 0.0140 -0.63 0.525        0.014 0.0098 1.42 0.156       
REPEXP  BUDGET 0.022 0.0079 2.78 0.005 ***  0.016 0.0067 2.37 0.018  **  
PAYHISTHQ -0.008 0.0029 -2.76 0.006 ***  -0.006 0.0022 -2.87 0.004 *** 
N      130#        149#    
Pseudo-R2     0.298         0.182     
 
This table reports four regressions to analyze headquarters’ project decisions (Panel 1) and information acquisitions (Panel 2). We use 
logistic regressions with standard errors clustered at headquarters’ level in order to account for multiple observations within subjects. 
Individual fixed effects are included but the coefficient values for the subject dummies are not reported in the table.  
The dependent variable is headquarters’ decision to accept the project (1) or to reject it (0) in Panel 1 and headquarters’ decision to 
acquire information (1) or not (0) in Panel 2.  
The independent variables are REPEXP, ESTSLACK and PAYHISTHQ in Panel 1 and BUDGET, REPEXP – BUDGET and PAYHISTHQ 
in Panel 2.  
The treatments included into the regressions are centralization and non-binding budgets (CNB), and delegation and non-binding 
budgets (DNB).  
# denotes a case in which the number of observations is reduced due to decisions that are perfectly explained by the player dummies: 
Some players always realized projects (Panel 1) and some players never bought information (Panel 2). 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Variable definitions: 
BUDGET = headquarters’ announced budget limit (CB, CNB) or allocated budget (DB, DNB); 
REPEXP = division manager’s cost report (CB, CNB), expenditure or budget request (DB, DNB); 
PAYHISTHQ = aggregate payoff of headquarters up to the respective round; 
ESTSLACK = headquarters’ estimation (using Bayes rule) with respect to the maximum amount of slack the division manager  
                          could have realized without breaking the budget. 
 
Panel 2 of Table 3 shows that the difference REP-
EXP  BUDGET provides some explanation for 
information acquisition in both treatments: the 
higher this difference, the more likely is information 
acquisition. In contrast, while the coefficient of 
BUDGET is not in the predicted direction under 
centralization, it has the predicted sign under dele-
gation and its magnitude is comparable to the effect 
of REPEXP  BUDGET. Thus, under delegation, a 
more generous initial budget seems to increase the 
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probability of information acquisition, although this 
effect is statistically not significant. 
Finally, we study the value of full commitment (i.e., 
of budgets being binding) in the delegation and the 
centralization case. Although theoretical considera-
tions would predict a positive value of commitment 
for HQ in both cases, the effect should be larger 
under centralization than under delegation due to 
the interaction effect between delegation and com-
mitment. The effect should also be nonzero under 
delegation which means that although delegation is 
a commitment device, it is not a perfect substitute 
for a binding budget. The descriptive data in Table 1 
are consistent with this. Although DM increases 
both under centralization and delegation when 
budgets are non-binding, the increase is larger un-
der centralization (52.81 vs. 34.05) than under dele-
gation (45.70 vs. 36.22). For HQ, the difference 
between centralization and delegation is even more 
pronounced: Under centralization, HQ decreases 
strongly (41.98 vs. 32.80, p = 0.0016, T-test) where-
as under delegation, the corresponding decrease in 
HQ is modest and insignificant (39.31 vs. 37.12, 
p = 0.2048, T-test). Thus, under delegation, HQ’s 
financial loss from a loss in commitment to the 
budget is economically small and even statistically 
insignificant. This further supports our view of dele-
gation indeed providing a partial substitute for 
budget commitment. 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper, we experimentally studied a capital 
budgeting process that is characterized by superior 
information for a division manager who has prefer-
ences for slack and by headquarters’ trade-off be-
tween the benefits of slack reduction and the costs 
of inefficient investment decisions. The main focus 
of the experiment was on the interaction between 
the organizational design of the budgeting process 
(centralization versus delegation) and headquarters’ 
ability to commit to a capital budget. In particular, 
we studied the moderating influence of headquar-
ters’ ability to commit to the budget on the effects of 
delegation. We hypothesized that delegation should 
be beneficial for headquarters when commitment is 
not possible but that the effects of delegation could 
be negative in a setting with commitment. We ar-
gued that the former positive effect of delegation 
would be due to delegation serving as a substitute 
for external or reputational commitment and that 
the latter negative effect could result from honesty 
preferences of the division managers acting in favor 
of a centralized setting. 
In our experiment, we find overall confirmatory 
evidence for our conjecture of commitment as a 
moderating variable for the effects of delegation. In 
particular, our findings imply that delegation in-
creases subjective commitment of HQ in a setting 
without external commitment and that this in-
creased commitment is anticipated by the division 
managers. Under delegation, participants in the role 
of headquarters are only willing to fund budget 
requests that are significantly smaller than the cost 
reports approved under centralization, and division 
managers’ budget requests are in turn significantly 
smaller than the cost reports under centralization. 
Overall, the effect is beneficial for headquarters as 
headquarters’ payoff increases. Moreover, in our 
experimental setting, delegation even makes the 
decrease in headquarters’ payoff from a loss in 
commitment insignificant. 
In contrast, we find only weak evidence for honesty 
preferences in the setting with commitment. While 
the effects are in the predicted direction, they are 
not large enough to be statistically significant. This 
represents supplementary evidence to Rankin, 
Schwartz, and Young (2008) with respect to the role 
of honesty preferences in budgeting as it shows that 
even under reduced strategic interaction, honesty 
preferences do no longer seem to have any effect. 
Thus, with respect to budgeting practice, it seems to 
be rather unlikely that honesty preferences play a 
major role. 
Our results have implications for the design of 
budgeting processes. Delegation, or more precisely 
the allocation of a budget and the corresponding 
decision right to a division manager, is a behavior-
ally relevant organizational design alternative as it 
affects capital budgeting processes in different ways 
contingent on the degree of budgetary commitment. 
It is particularly relevant if headquarters cannot 
commit to the budget, i.e., if the division manager 
has the option to apply for a budget increase. This 
underlines the importance of considering deviations 
from standard individual rationality assumptions 
when designing budgeting systems. 
As a matter of fact, a generalization of our results is 
limited by our design. Although we modeled an 
organizational aspect of budgeting which seems to 
be relevant from a practical perspective, budgeting 
processes in practice are characterized by far-richer 
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and more complex organizational features which are 
likely to interact. Furthermore, the design of a 
budgeting process may affect its outcomes also 
through other factors or individual preferences such 
as preferences for procedural fairness or for norm 
enforcement (see, e.g., Frey, Benz, and Stutzer 
2004, Wentzel 2004.). Our results were derived 
from a one-shot setting, where participants played 
separate games with new partners in every round of 
the experiment. Consequently, the results are unaf-
fected by reputational motives. Reputation is an 
alternative source of commitment, and so a re-
peated design would provide evidence with respect 
to delegation and reputation being complements or 
substitutes. Although we think that this question is 
worth analyzing, the analysis itself is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Our results encourage us to suggest further analysis 
of organizational aspects of budgeting, such as the 
allocation of decision rights, social distances implied 
by organizational design choices or communication 
channels to deepen our understanding of their be-
havioral effects on the involved agents. 
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Appendix: Instructions to 
Participants 
In the following, we first present the complete in-
structions (translated from German) for the treat-
ment with delegation and non-binding budgets 
(DNB). Subsequently, we present extracts from the 
instructions for all other treatments that refer to the 
core differences in the treatment designs. 
A1   Instructions for the DNB treatment 
Preliminary remarks 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this 
experiment. The experiment is funded by the Uni-
versity of Göttingen. The purpose of the experiment 
is to analyze economic decision making. 
You have received a participant code to log in for 
this experiment. Please keep the participant code 
with you. You will need it to identify yourself when 
the money you have earned is paid out to you. 
The purpose of the participant code is to ensure full 
anonymity of the participants, both to each other 
and to the experimenters. Neither the experiment-
ers nor other participants will be able to identify you 
by observing your decisions. 
For your participation in the experiment, you will 
receive 5 EUR. Any further remuneration that you 
will earn during the experiment – contingent on 
your decisions – will be paid out additionally to 
these 5 EUR. 
During the experiment, your income will be meas-
ured in points where  
                         50 points = 1 EUR. 
All points that you earn during the experiment will 
be summed up at the end, converted into EUR and 
immediately paid out to you in cash. 
Please note:  
- You may not speak during the experiment.  
- Make your own decisions and do not converse with 
other participants.  
If you have a question during the experiment, please 
raise your hand. We will then answer it in private. 
At the end of the instructions, you will have the 
opportunity to ask questions if something is still 
unclear. 
Participants and course of the experiment 
In this experiment, there are two types of partici-
pants that will be called A-players and B-players in 
the following. 
                  You are an A-player/a B-player. 
During the whole experiment, you will make your 
decisions as an A-player/as a B-player. 
The experiment consists of ten rounds. At the be-
ginning of each round, the A-players will be ran-
domly matched with B-players. There will be a new 
random rematching in each round. 
Your decisions will be anonymously transmitted to 
your partner of the corresponding round via the 
computer network. No other participant will ever 
learn your name or your participant code during or 
after the experiment, i.e., your decisions will remain 
completely anonymous. 
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Setting 
It may be helpful for you to imagine the experimen-
tal setting as follows: An A-player acts as the owner 
of a firm. His corresponding B-player can realize a 
project on behalf of the A-player. The project yields 
a revenue of 200 points. The project costs are be-
tween 0 and 200 points. 
In every round, the actual costs are randomly de-
termined for every pair of A- and B-players. 
Costs: Random draw from the range 0 to 200
Revenue
0                                                               200  
The potential cost values will only be integers be-
tween 0 and 200. 
The actual costs that are randomly determined for a 
pair of A- and B-players are known only to the B-
player. The A-player is not informed about the out-
come of the drawing. 
Every round of the experiment consists of four 
steps. 
Step 1: 
In the first step, the computer randomly determines 
the actual costs of the round as explained above. 
The B-player is informed about these costs. 
In the first step, the A-player determines a cost 
budget which is allocated to the B-player. The cost 
budget has to be an integer between 0 and 200 
points. The A-player determines the cost budget 
without knowing the actual costs. 
Step 2: 
In the second step, the B-player is informed about 
the cost budget. The B-player now has two possibili-
ties: He can directly decide about the realization of 
the project or he can request a budget increase.  
Option (1): The B-player decides about the realiza-
tion of the project. The B-player can either reject the 
project – in this case, both players will receive zero 
points from the project – or decide to realize it if the 
actual costs do not exceed the cost budget deter-
mined by the A-player. In this case, the B-player has 
to specify how much of the budget he will expend. 
The expended costs cannot be smaller than the ac-
tual costs and cannot be larger than the allocated 
cost budget. 
Option (2): The B-player requests a budget increase. 
If the B-player wants to realize the project, but also 
wants to expend costs that exceed the cost budget 
determined by the A-player, the B-player can re-
quest a budget increase from the A-player. To do 
this, the B-player reports to the A-player the cost 
amount which he wants to expend for the project 
instead of the cost budget. This amount may not 
exceed 200 points. If the B-player requests a budget 
increase he no longer decides about the realization 
of the project. The decision about the project reali-
zation will then be made by the A-player. 
Step 3: 
In the third step, the A-player will be informed 
about the B-player’s decision: He learns whether the 
B-player decided himself or requests a budget in-
crease. If the B-player decided himself the A-player 
is informed about this decision. In case the B-player 
realized the project, the A-player also learns how 
much of the budget (i.e., which cost amount) the B-
player expended. 
If the B-player requests a budget increase, the A-
player is informed about the cost amount the B-
player would like to expend. 
In both cases, i.e., independent of whether he de-
cides about the project realization or whether the B-
player has already decided, the A-player can acquire 
information.  
The cost of the information for the A-player is 10 
points. The information will be as follows: “The 
actual costs are within the range [… to …].”  
“[… to …]” is the range of the actual project costs of 
the round. There are eight potential ranges: 
[0 to 25] [26 to 50] [176 to 200]… …  
The information is not 100% reliable. With a prob-
ability of 70%, the reported range is correct, i.e., the 
actual cost lies in the range. With a probability of 
30%, the information reports a different, wrong 
range. Each of the seven other ranges is equally 
likely in this case. 
Please consider the following example for illustra-
tion: 
[0 to 25] [26 to 50] [176 to 200]… …[76 to 100] …
80
 
The actual costs are 80. With a probability of 70%, 
the A-player will receive the information “The actual 
costs are within the range [76 to 100].” In contrast, 
with a probability of 30%, the information will indi-
cate one of the other ranges. 
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Step 4: 
In the fourth step, the A-player receives the infor-
mation if he has acquired it in the third step.  
If the B-player has decided about the realization of 
the project himself, the round ends. 
In contrast, if the B-player has requested a budget 
increase, the A-player will now decide whether the 
project will be realized or not. The A-player has only 
two options: Either he decides to realize the project 
and to allocate a cost budget equal to the requested 
amount to the B-player, or he decides to reject the 
project. The A-player cannot realize the project 
without allocating the full amount of the requested 
budget to the B-player. 
Remunerations of the A- and B-player: 
Every A-player and every B-player will have a points 
account during the experiment. At the beginning of 
the experiment, the account balance will be 100 
points. The balance increases or decreases accord-
ing to the points that every player will receive in the 
course of the experiment.  
In every round, the account balance changes as 
follows: 
  Case 1: The project is not realized. 
  If the project is not realized, both the A-player and 
the B-player will receive zero points from the pro-
ject. If the A-player acquires the information, the 
information costs will be charged, and the account 
balance decreases by 10 points. 
  Case 2: The B-player does not request a budget 
increase and realizes the project. 
  If the B-player does not request a budget increase 
and realizes the project, he receives the expended 
costs less the actual project costs.  
  Thus, for the points of the B-player, it follows: 
  B-player points = expended costs – actual costs 
  The A-player, as the project owner, receives the 
net revenue, i.e., the project revenue (200 points) 
less the expended costs. If the A-player acquires 
the information, the information costs will be 
charged (10 points). 
Thus, for the points of the A-player in a given 
round, it follows: 
  A-player points = 200 – expended costs – 10 (in 
case the information is acquired)  
  Case 3: The B-player requests a budget increase 
and the A-player realizes the project. 
  If the B-player requests a budget increase and the 
A-player decides to realize the project, the B-
player receives the cost amount requested and 
approved by the A-player less the actual costs.  
  Thus, for the points of the B-player, it follows: 
  B-player points = approved costs – actual costs 
  The A-player, as the project owner, receives the 
net revenue. The net revenue corresponds to the 
project revenue (200 points) less the costs ap-
proved. If the A-player acquires the information, 
the information costs will be charged (10 points). 
  Thus, for the points of the A-player in a given 
round, it follows: 
  A-player points = 200 – approved costs – 10 (in 
case the information is acquired)  
Summary 
  You will earn 5 EUR from the experiment plus 
your collected points that will be converted into 
Euro as follows: 50 points = 1 EUR. The initial 
balance of your account is 100 points. 
  In the experiment, there are A-players and B-
players. You are an A-player/a B-player. 
  You will make decisions in ten rounds. In every 
round, A- and B-players are randomly matched. 
You will remain anonymous. 
  The B-player can realize a project on behalf of the 
A-player. The project yields revenue of 200 
points. The project costs are between 0 and 200 
points. The actual costs are randomly drawn by 
the computer and are only known to the B-player. 
The A-player is not informed about the outcome 
of the drawing. 
  Every round consists of four steps.  
  Step 1: The B-player learns the costs; the A-player 
determines a cost budget. 
  Step 2: The B-player decides about the project or 
requests a budget increase. 
  Step 3: The A-player can acquire information. 
  Step 4: If the B-player has requested a budget 
increase, the A-player decides about the project. 
The round ends. 
  If the B-player requests a budget increase, the A-
player decides about the project but cannot 
change the budget. Either he rejects the project or 
he realizes the project and approves the requested 
cost budget. If the B-player decides about the pro-
ject and realizes it, he has to specify how much of 
the cost budget he would like to expend.  
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  The information indicates a range that contains 
the actual project costs. It is only correct with a 
probability of 70%. If the project is not realized, 
the A-player and the B-player will receive zero 
points from the project. If the B-player does not 
request a budget increase and realizes the project, 
he receives the difference between the expended 
costs and the actual costs. The A-player receives 
the revenue less the expended costs. If the B-
player requests a budget increase and the A-player 
realizes the project, the B-player receives the re-
quested cost budget less the actual costs. The A-
player receives the revenue less the requested cost 
budget. 
  The A-player’s points from the project decrease by 
10 if he acquires the information. 
A2   Instructions for the CNB treatment: 
         Modifications to DNB instructions 
[...] 
Setting 
[...] 
Step 1: 
In the first step, the computer randomly determines 
the actual costs of the round as explained above. 
The B-player is informed about these costs. 
In the first step, the A-player sets a cost limit which 
is communicated to the B-player. The cost limit has 
to be an integer between 0 and 200 points. The A-
player determines the cost limit without knowing 
the actual costs. 
By setting the cost limit, limit the A-player commu-
nicates to the B-player the maximum cost he is will-
ing to fund. If the B-player’s cost report exceeds the 
cost limit, the A-player intends to deny funding. If 
the cost report is lower than or equal to the cost 
limit, the A-player intends to approve the budget 
and to realize the project. However, the A-player is 
not bound to the cost limit. This will be explained in 
more detail below. 
Step 2: 
In the second step, the B-player is informed about 
the cost limit set by the A-player. The B-player now 
makes his cost report to the A-player. The cost re-
port has to be an integer. It must not exceed 200 
points, and it must not be lower than the actual 
costs. There are no further restrictions with respect 
to the cost report. The computer system will check 
the restrictions and will only pass cost reports that 
fulfill the requirements. 
Step 3: 
In the third step, the A-player will be informed 
about the B-player’s cost report. Next, and before 
deciding about project realization, the A-player can 
acquire information. [...] 
Step 4: 
In the fourth step, the A-player receives the infor-
mation if he has acquired it in the third step.  
The A-player will now decide whether the project 
will be realized or not. The A-player only has two 
options: Either he decides to realize the project and 
to allocate a cost budget equal to the cost report to 
the B-player, or he decides to reject the project. The 
A-player cannot realize the project without allocat-
ing the full amount of the reported costs to the B-
player. 
Please note: When deciding about project realiza-
tion, the A-player is not bound to the announced 
budget limit. That means that the A-player’s deci-
sion about project realization, given the B-player’s 
cost report, is free and independent of the cost limit 
announced before. 
Remunerations of the A- and B-player: 
[...] 
In every round, the account balance changes as 
follows: 
  Case 1: The project is not realized. 
  If the project is not realized, both the A-player and 
the B-player will receive zero points from the pro-
ject. If the A-player acquires the information, the 
information costs will be charged, and the account 
balance decreases by 10 points. 
  Case 2: The project is realized.  
  If the A-player decides to realize the project, the 
B-player receives an amount equal to his cost re-
port less the actual costs. Thus, for the points of 
the B-player, it follows: 
  B-player points = reported costs – actual costs 
  The A-player, as the project owner, receives the 
net revenue. The net revenue equals the project 
revenue (200 points) less the costs reported. If the 
A-player acquires the information, the informa-
tion costs will be charged (10 points). Thus, for the 
points of the A-player in a given round, it follows: 
  A-player points = 200 – reported costs – 10 (in 
case the information is acquired)  
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Summary 
[...] 
  Every round consists of four steps:  
  Step 1: The B-player learns the costs; the A-player 
determines a cost limit. 
  Step 2: The B-player makes a cost report to the A-
player. 
  Step 3: The A-player can acquire information. 
  Step 4: The A-player decides about the project. 
The round ends. 
  After receiving the cost report, the A-player de-
cides about the project but cannot change the 
budget. Either he rejects the project or he realizes 
the project and approves the reported costs.  
  The information indicates a range that contains 
the actual project costs. It is only correct with a 
probability of 70%. 
  If the project is not realized, the A-player and the 
B-player will receive zero points from the project. 
If the project is realized, the B-player receives the 
costs reported less the actual costs. The A-player 
receives the revenue less the reported costs. 
[...] 
A3   Instructions for the DB treatment: 
         Modifications to DNB instructions 
[...] 
Setting 
[...] 
Step 1: 
[...] In the first step, the A-player determines a cost 
budget which is allocated to the B-player. The cost 
budget is binding: The A-player cannot change it at 
a later step of the round. The cost budget has to be 
an integer between 0 and 200 points. The A-player 
determines the cost budget without knowing the 
actual costs. 
Step 2: 
In the second step, the B-player is informed about 
the cost budget. The B-player now has to make his 
decisions:  
First, he has to decide whether he wants to realize 
the project with the budget allocated to him or not. 
He can only realize the project if the budget covers 
the actual cost. A request for a budget increase is not 
possible. If the B-player cannot realize the project, 
or if the B-player decides to reject realization, both 
players will receive zero points from the project. 
Second, if the budget covers the actual costs and if 
the B-player wants to realize the project, he has to 
specify how much of the budget he will expend. The 
expended costs cannot be smaller than the actual 
costs and cannot be larger than the allocated cost 
budget. [...] 
A4   Instructions for the CB treatment: 
         Modifications to CNB instructions 
[...] 
Setting 
[...] 
By setting the cost limit, limit the A-player commu-
nicates to the B-player the maximum cost he will 
fund. The cost limit is binding. This means that the 
A-player’s decision follows automatically from the 
B-player’s cost report: If the B-player’s cost report 
exceeds the cost limit, funding is denied. If the cost 
report is lower than or equal to the cost limit, the 
project will be realized. [...] 
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